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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STYLE CRETE, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
10902 
Complaints in condemnation were filed by the State 
Road Commission in late 1965 and early 1966 to acquire the 
property of Style Crete, Inc. (hereafter referred to as 
"Style-Crete") for the relocwtion of the main line track of 
the Western Pacific Railroad and for the construction of a 
new highway known as 2300 West Street in Salt Lake City. 
Both acquisitions were incident to the devielopment of the 
Interstate Highway System in westerly Salt Lake City. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The law issues as to the right of condemnation, public 
use and necessity, and other jurisdictional prerequisites 
were admitted in the Commission's favor. 'Dhe cases were 
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thereafter consolidated for joint trial on the questions of 
just compensation (R. 13, 121-122). A special jury venire 
was impaneled and the hearing on value and damages com-
menced on March 13, 1967. After 8 days of trial, the jury 
returned into open court special interrogatories which found 
the difference between the value of the total property before 
condemnation and the value of the remaining property after 
condemnation in the sum of $122,500.00. Judgment on the 
interrogatories was thereafter entered by the trial Court 
(R. 91-94). 
The Commission's Motion for a New Trial was denied 
on April 27, 1967 (R. 95, 99-100). 
MAP OF SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TAKING 
Attached as Appendix 1 herein is a reproduction of 
trial Exhibit D-1 illustrative of the Style-Crete property 
on the base sheet, the expansion plans of Style-Crete on 
overlay # 1, and the course and alignment of the two con-
demnaJtion takings on overlay #2. The Western Pacific 
acquisition is shown as it cuts through the property in an 
east-west direction directly in front of the industrial plant, 
and the 2300 West acquisition as it courses the property 
east of the plant, south to north. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While some parts of Appellant's Statement of Facts 
recount accurately the events of trial, in the main it does 
not. Appellant's Statement (pp. 2-12 of its Brief) is sub-
stantially misleading, inaccurate in context and violative 
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of several long-established principles - it offends the rule 
that the facts shall be presented in a light which most fav-
orably support the findings and verdict of the jury, it fails 
to set out the substantial evidence of both parties and the 
admissions made by the State's value witness, and the State-
ment is argumentative rather than factual in nature. In-
deed, the Statement on pages 8, 10-12 of the State's Brief 
partakes of jury argument on the weight of the testimony. 
As a result, Respondent will herein make its own statement 
of the facts of trial, bearing in mind the admonition of Rule 
75(p), U. R. C. P. 
1. Property Before Condemnation. 
The property \Vas situated in the general industrial 
area between 2200-2400 West on the north side of 5th South 
Street in Salt Lake City (Ex. D-1). Of irregular shape, flat 
in slope and of fair drainage, the property was comprised 
of 14.26 acres. Access and frontage of better than 63 feet 
were afforded directly from 5th South Street (R. 180, 647). 
The property was used for the manufacture of pre-cast 
stone products, all phases of fabrication being carried out 
in a specially designed building locaited at the west front 
section of the premises (R. 252, Ex. D-1). Comprising 
17 ,000 square feet and constructed of steel beams and joists, 
reinforced, double load-bearing walls, cement flooring and 
stone walls, the building was built in several phases from 
1958 through 1962 as business conditions warranted, at a 
cost of $110,000.00 (R. 246-254, 359-360, 365-369). Upon 
the advice of McCown E. Hunt, a structural and design en-
gineer, the building was built so that raw materials would 
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pass from front to rear (or south to north) in the manu-
facturing process. The economic and functional utility of 
the building, itself, was dependent upon continuity of the 
south to north process (R. 396-401, 439, 441, 496, 497). 
There being no sewer in the area, sanitation was pro-
vided by a Board of Health approved septic tank and drain 
field within the Style-Crete property, located southeast of 
the manufacturing plant and beneath the customer parking 
area (R. 506-512). 
The critical phase of the manufacturing process occur-
red at the south end of the building in the "casting section". 
After the aggregate was mixed, transported by crane, and 
poured into specially constructed molds of required size, 
the cast stone underwent controlled vibration to insure uni-
formity and removal of air bubbles (R. 384-395, 414-447). 
After the stone began to set up and cm·e during the "green 
period," it was imperative that the molds be not thereafter 
subject to uncontrolled or foreign ground movement and 
vibration{R. 444-447). The Engineer Hunt, Architect Budd 
and the owner all testified to the exacting specifications for 
cast stone (R. 384-395, 444-447, 475-479). The average 
thickness of cast stone slabs is 214 inches (R. 388). The 
required tolerances are 1/16 inch or less for panels 5 feet 
wide and 13 feet long (R. 475-476). Vibration during the 
"green period" could result in warping or cracking. The 
cast stone manufactured by Style-Crete was as large as 56 
feet long, 4 feet wide 1 foot thick and weighed 20 tons (R. 
255). Hunt and Budd further testified that in addition to 
the close manufacturing tolerances of cast stone, uncon-
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trolled vibrations during the early curing stage or "green 
period" would impair its structural strength (R. 444-447, 
481). 
The front of the property had site prominence and full 
view from 5th South Street, while the conglomerate and 
congested section of the plant in the rear was removed 
from public and customer observation (R. 595-598). At 
the date of condemnation, Style-Crete had planned and se-
cured a building permit to construct the final phase of the 
industrial plant, enlargement of the engineering offices and 
expansion of the entrance and parking facilities (R. 371-
3711, D-1 Overlay #1). 
The property had functioned as a fully operable cast 
stone manufacturing plant for several years and the testi-
mony was unequivocal from every witness qualified fo 
speak on the subject, both for Style-Crete and the State, 
that the highest and best use of the subject property was 
the use actually made, i.e., a cast stone industrial site (R. 
570-573, 710). 
The market value of the land and building was evalu-
ated by the witnesses for both parties under accepted stand-
ards, cost replacement less depreciation of the building, and 
market comparison on the land (R. 549, 582-594, 710-726). 
Fo1· the landowner, B. Lue Bettilyon of Bettilyon Construc-
tion Company testified that the cost to construct the manu-
facturing building new in 1966 was $123,322.00. Applying 
to that sum a factor for estimated depreciation, the lanj-
owner's appraisal expert, Ray A. Williams, testified that 
the depreciated value of the building was $111,787.00 (R. 
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590). Based on comparable sales, Williams determined the 
market value of the land to be $5,000.00 per acre or $71,-
325.00 fo1· the 14.26 acres. His total appraisal was $183,-
000.00 (R. 590-594, Ex. D-25). C. Francis Solomon, ap-
praiser called by the State, opined that the depreciated 
value of the building before the taking plus the value of 
the land, itself was $184,600.00 (R. 726). The expert testi-
mony of borth parties produced little conflict as to the fair 
market value of the total property before condemnation. 
In fact, the appraisal of the State's witness was nearly 
$1500.00 higher than that of Style-Crete's witness, Wil-
liams. 
2. Nature of Condemnation Taking by State. 
The two acquisitions of the State were: 
Railroad taking. The Western Pacific right of way cut 
across the front portion of the Style-Crete property 
east-west, 100 feet in width and on a dirt and rock fill 
of 8 to 9 feet in heighth (R. 189-195, Ex. D-1). Fully 
fenced on both sides and in front of the Style-Crete 
building as well, it did not permit access crossing ex-
cept at 2300 West Street (R. 199-201). Normal water 
drainage conduits along the right of way were not pro-
vided (R. 211). The north edge of the right of way 
came within 9 to 10 feet of the Southwest corner of the 
manufacturing building (R. 189), the center of the 
tracks being 80 feet from the casting tables in the 
plant (R. 304-305). The W. P. trainmaster testified 
that the track would be used by 12 trains daily, 5 heavy 
freights in each direction and one passenger train each 
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way (R. 225). The trains would reach speeds of 60 to 
80 miles per hour in the Style-Crete area (R. 228-229), 
and the freights would average 80 to 100 cars with a 
gross weight of 5,000 tons (R. 226-227). 
Highway Taking. The 2:300 West acquisition was 80 
feet in width and coursed through the property south 
to north (R. 181, 204). On a continuous dirt fill 3 to 
9 feet, its sloped embankments prohibited direct ac-
cess from the remaining Style-Crete property, save at 
a point north of the plant (R. 729). No provisions 
were made by the Highway Department for drainage 
or water collection ditches on either side of the high-
way (R. 207). 
The total acreage taken from the owner was 1.999, .41 
acre for the railroad and 1.58 acres for the highway. 
3. Testimony on Remaining Property After Condemnation. 
It was with respect to the effect of the two partial-
takings upon the highest and best use and the value of the 
remaining property of Style-Crete that the expert testimony 
was at odds. Style-Crete called six witnesses on the subject 
and the Highway Department called 3 witnesses. Regard-
ing best use and value after condemnation, the witnesses 
of Style-Crete variously took stock of the following factors: 
(a) The building was placed in a depressed corner, 
locked in by a nine foot high railroad right of way 11 
feet distant on the south and by a nine foot high road-
way immediately on the east (R. 194, 378, 670, D-1). 
The two acquisitions had produced a pincer or scis-
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sors effect on the plant and its remaining use, block-
ing all front entrances and access from 5th South 
Street, removing all employee and customer parking, 
preventing any feasible use of the south and east sides 
of the building, and restricting use of the storage yar Js 
on the east (R. 402--104, 496, 497, 509-602). Hunt tes-
tified that all reasonable access to the office, engineer-
ing room and the display areas for customers had been 
eliminated by the takings, and that the critical aggre-
gate storage area was cut off by the 2300 West fill. The 
architect, Budd, said that customers cannot get to the 
plant without going through the rear end (R. 448-451, 
496-497). 
(b) Vibration. It was the opm10n of two engineer-
ing experts and an architect that the probabilities were 
such that the ground vibration caused by the freight 
trains on the W. P. track in front of the remaining 
building would unreasonably jeopadize the structural 
soundness and tolerance requirements of the cast stone 
process in the building. The leading witness, Mr. Leeds, 
gave empirical as well as opinion evidence of vibration 
damage. One of a half dozen qualified engineering 
seismologists in the U. S. (R. 300), Leeds had not only 
measured, but had evaluaJted the nature, strength, 
source and effect of all types of grounJ movement, 
trains, freeways, earthquakes, missile firings, ertc., 
throughout the world (R. 283-292). He had monitored 
and evaluated the effect of passing railroad trains 
upon concrete structures at various industrial facili-
ties in the country (R. 293-300). Leeds made actual 
recordings of ground vibration on the old W. P. and 
the existent U. P. lines 80 feet distant from center 
track. By soil analysis, ground geology at the monitor-
ing points were determined to be uniform with soil 
conditions of Style-Crete. Applying the vibration fac-
tor actually measured to the remaining property of 
Style-Crete, Leeds opined that the ground movement 
would "possibly cause damage to the curing concrete 
in the initial stages to a degree that incipient hidden 
damage might be sustained" (R. 301-320). Further-
more, Mr. Leeds was of the judgment that the building 
could not be used for any industrial use requiring pre-
cision work (R. 322-331). 
McCown E. Hunt, having written substantial spec-
ifications for cast stone and having designed several 
cast stone plants lR. 435, 436-444), was of the judg-
ment that the railroad vibration would substantially 
affect the stability of a cast stone product were an 
attempt made to manufacture after condemnation (R. 
445-447). 
Mr. Budd testified of the need for exac.tness in 
cast stone fabrication and the critical points of setting 
up and curing of the initial concrete molds (R. 474-
476). He, too, had prepared substantial specificaitions 
for cast stone products on large commercial buildings. 
Whereas the Style-Crete plant had been a competent 
manufacturing facility prior to condemnation, Budd 
was of the judgment that by reason of the vibration 
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and scissor influence of the two takings, the remaining 
building was no longer functional as such. As an ar-
chitect, he would not accept the products of such a 
plant (R. 476-485). 
(c) Water Ponding. After construction of the rail-
road and highway, substantial ponding of water oc-
curred in the pocket created along the railroad and 
highway immediately south and east of the building 
(R. 508-510, 527). Lack of drainage facilities in the 
condemned area kept the water impounded and made 
it impractical to move equipment in the area or to store 
materials (R. 428-430, 451-453). Style-Crete had ex-
perienced no such ponding problems before condemna-
tion (R. 432). 
( d) Sanitation. The compacted railroad dike had 
knocked out the septic tank system and drainage field 
of Style-Crete (R. 451-453). The assistant sanitary 
engineer for Salt Lake City, A. R. Cardwell, stated 
that in his judgment, a feasible and adequate septic 
tank system for industrial use, could not be relocated 
at other points on the Style-Crete property after con-
demnation due to soil conditions and water table (R. 
506-512, Ex. D-22). The State, on page 12 of its State-
ment of Facts, argues that the testimony of Mr. Card-
well on the loss of the building's sanita.tion facility, 
was of "doubtful weight.1'' 
iSignificantly, the State offered no testimony, whatsoever, at trial to 
meet the evidence of sanitation damage, and the testimony of Cardwell 
stood before the jury and stands before this Court uncontroverted. 
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( e) The combination of the two takings created a 
physical severance of the remainder into three inde-
pendent tracts (Ex. D-1, R. 182-183). The integrity 
of the property was ruptured by the condemnation and 
little relationship remained OOtween the divorced 
pieces. Particularly was this so with respect to the 
small triangle of .53 acre left south of the railroad 
which now only had value for speculation (R. 668). 
(f) Best Use and Value. Because of one or more of 
the foregoing, it was the opinion of all expert wit-
nesses, including Solomon for the State, that the build-
ing and remaining land no longer had as its highest 
use, that of a cast stone manufacturing plant. Hunt 
said that the building should be abandoned as a fabri-
cation site because of the hazards of vibration and the 
proximate position of the plant up against the two tak-
ings (R. 448-451). Leeds concluded that vibration risks 
rendered the building of use only for dead storage (R. 
322). The appraisers, Williams and Solomon, were in 
agreement that the vibration hazards were of sufficient 
consequence to the buyer and seller in the market so 
as to conclude that the property was no longer suited 
for cast stone or any other precision manufacturing 
use (R. 603, 729), but they differed in their judgments 
as to what reasonable use could be made of the build-
ing. On the one hand, Williams thought the building to 
be suited only for industrial storage (R. 668-675). 
Solomon, on the other hand, was of the opinion that 
the building could be used for light industrial and non-
technical manufacturing (R. 827-828). 
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Having admitted that the vibration and close prox-
imity of the railroad and 2300 West could destroy the 
functional utility of the building, Mr. Solomon was 
nevertheless of the judgment that the remaining build-
ing had a market value of $68,750.00 (R. 832). He 
acknowledged that if that building were to be con-
structed new and free from all the damaging effects of 
the railroad and 2300 West, its cost new would be only 
$77,380.00 (R. 834). He did not testify as to any com-
parable properties, sale or rental, in support of his 
$68,750.00 opinion. Mr. Williams determined the fair 
market value of the remaining building was $28,036.36 
(R. 629), and as a basis, elicited several transactions 
involving comparable warehouse properties, sale and 
rental (R. 623-629). 
(g) Abandonment. By reason of the condemnation 
suit, Style-Crete elected to abandon the building 
for further manufacturing and was in the process of 
so doing at the time of trial (R. 450-451). The owner 
testified that the proximity and effect of the railroad 
and highway made it economically impractical and un-
feasible to reorganize or relocate sections of the plant 
within the building (R. 430-431). 
4. Other Available Land Proffer of State. 
At no other time in the trial did Style-Crete introduce 
or offer any testimony running to the claim that by reason 
of the amount and type of acreage under ownership, the 
total property, before condemnation, constituted an eco-
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nomic unit dependent on its size for full value. Nor was it 
any part of Style-Crete's case thait any such economic unit 
had been destroyed or damaged by reason of the physical 
loss of the 1.99 acres actually taken and shrinkage of the 
unit. 
Nonetheless, the highway department during its case 
in chief, offered to show that as of December, 1965, there 
was available for sale by Arnold Machinery Company, ten 
acres of prnperty on the immediate west of Style-Crete (R. 
93,1). The proffer of State counsel, made out of hearing of 
the jury, i·epresented that the Arnold property was land-
locked without access, and that it was bounded "on the 
north by the old Western Pacific right-of-way" (R. 934). 
Appellant has, however, inserted as Appendix - Figure 3 
in its Brief, a plat which would have the Arnold land abut-
ting a city street on the north. 2 (See Sfate's Brief p. 43.) 
The Court had previously denied several attempts of the 
State to raise the question during cross-examination of the 
witnesses for Style-Crete. 
The State's pro ff er was denied by the Court on the 
ground that the availability of other land was not legally 
relevant under the facts of this case (R. 937). The 
State did not offer the sale of the Arnold land as a com-
parable sales transaction, although invited to do so by the 
trial Judge (R. 937). And Mr. Solomon, the State's only 
value witness, did not rely on the availability of neighbor-
2Appendix .3 of Appellant's Brief is imaginary and styled to suit the 
State',, intentions herein. Nothing resembling this drawing was ten-
deri:,d by the State to the trial Court. The Respondent moves that it 
be stricken and disregarded. 
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ing lands as a basis for his conclusions on either land value 
or severance damages. 
5. Charge to the Jury and Verdict. 
The trial Court inducted in its charge to the jury, 
either verbatim or in substance, 14 of Jthe 15 requests for 
for instructions submitted by the State (R. 63-80). By 
answers to special interrogatories the jury found that the 
af te,1· value of the Style-Crete properties was $122,500.00 
less than the value before the taking (R. 14). Judgment of 
just compensation was entered thereon on March 28, 1967 
(H.. 91-94). The motion for new trial filed by the State 
was denied April 27, 1967 (R. 95-96, 99-100). 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RE-
FUSING TO HEAR EVIDENCE OFFERED BY 
THE STATE AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF 
ADJACENT PROPERTY FOR PURCHASE BY 
THE DEFENDANT STYLE-CRETE. 
No issue is raised on this appeal that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the verdict. The State attemp.ts to 
overthrow the verdict and judgment by particular errors of 
the trial Court, which are without substance. The nub of 
the State's appeal is stated in Points I through III of its 
Brief, that the trial Court erred in refusing the State's 
proffer which purportedly would show that Style-Crete 
could have "purchased as replacement land" ten acres of 
landlocked property from its next door neighbor on the 
15 
west. No issue of "availability of replacement land" was 
raised by the pleadings or incorpomted within the pre-trial 
order (R. 121-123). Nevertheless, the State argues it here 
as a "triable issue" of severance damage. The answer to 
the State's claim lies in an understanding of the facts 
(which Respondent has set out in this Brief at some length) 
and of the nature of severance damages under considera· 
tion. Once digested, the facts dictate the application of the 
law and the conclusion that the State's proffer has no rele. 
vancy whatsoever to the issues of severance damage in this 
case. 
1. Severance Damage Valuation in Eminent Domain is Gov-
erned By The "Before and After" Rule. 
Art. I Sec. 22 of the State Constitution is declarative 
of the basic right to just compensation in eminent domain. 
The implementing statute, 78-34-10 U. C. A. 1953, provides 
for the measurement and payment of severance damage in 
the partial-condemnation of property: 
"Compensation and damages - How assessed. 
- The court, jury * * * must hear such legal 
evidence * * *, and thereupon must acertain 
and assess: 
"* * * 
"(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the dam· 
ages which will accrue to the portion not sought to 
be condemned by reason of its severance from the 
portion sought to be condemned and the construction 
of the improvement in the manner proposed by the 
plaintiff. * * *" (Italics added.) 
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In ascertaining what severance damage has been sus-
tained, this Court has long held fast to the rule that the 
measuring rod of that damage is the difference in the value 
of the prope1iy before and after condemnation. Stockdale 
v. Rio Grande W.R. Co. and Anheuser Busch Brewing As-
sor., 28 Utah 201, 77 Pac. 849 ( 1904); Telluride Power Co. 
v. Bruneau, 41 Utah 4, 125 Pac. 399 (1912); Weber Basin 
Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 U. 2d 253, 358 P. 2d 81 
(1960). In State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 
P. 2d 113 (19·18), Justice Pratt, for a unanimous Court, 
wrote of the definition: 
"The difference in the market value of the 
farm before and after condemnation does truly re-
flect that loss [severance damage] as presumably 
the difference will be founded upon the various 
changes incident to the proximity of the highway." 
The Comt has recently gi vc11 further attention to the 
methodology of severance damage in the leading decisions 
of State Road C01nm. v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 
76 (1961) and State Road Comm. v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 
383 P. 2d 917 (1963). In Peterson, it was said: 
"As to the error assigned in instructing on dam-
ages : notwithstanding the zealous efforts of coun-
sel to torture them, we think they were such that 
the jury understood and applied the correct measure 
of damages : for the land actually taken : the fair 
cash market value on the date of condemnation; and 
for severance damages to the remainder: the dif-
ference between its fair cash market value before 
and after the taking." (Emphasis added.) 
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And in State Road Comm. v. Hansen, supra, the rule 
remained constant: 
·'The issue of severance damages was also cor-
1·ectly fried and submitted to the jury under a 
proper instruction that the owner was not limited 
to the value of the land taken, but was entitled to 
'severance damages', that is, the difference in value 
of the remaining tract before and after the taking." 
Thus, in a cadre of decisions, this Court has firmly im-
planted as the rule of damages in severance valuation, the 
difference between the fair market value of the property 
before condemnation and its fair market value after con-
demnation and the construction of the public work. Nor is 
there anything singular about the holdings of the Utah 
Court on the point. The "before and after rule" of sever-
ance damage valuation has been adopted overwhelmingly 
by the high court of practically every state of the Union. 
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 528 Sec. 14.23, 5th ed.; 3 27 
Am. Jur. 2d 60 Ern. Dom. 271. 
In determining the diminution in the value of the re-
maining property caused by the partial-acquisition, all fac-
0In applying the "before and after principle" the treatise writers sug-
gest that the more logical and practical method is to determine the 
total just compensation to be paid by the difference between the value 
of the entire property before c:mdemnation and the value of the re-
maining property after condemnation, rather than to determine 
merely severance damage to the remainder by its value before and 
after. 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain 547, Sec. 14.23 5th ed.; 1 Orgel 
on Valuation under Eminent Domain 251, Sec. 52 2d ed. 
This criticism appears justified since it is a non-sequitur of sorts 
to evaluate the remaining property before condemnation, when in fact, 
there was no remaining property in existence before condemnation. 
The Utah cases are pemiissive of the suggested approach, and both 
parties herein proceeded on that basis in their testimony. 
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tors which reasonably tend to depreciate the remainder in 
the eyes of the buyer and seller in the open market may be 
taken into account. Telluride Water Power v. Bruneau, 41 
Utah 4, 125 Pac. 399 (1912); 4 Nichols on Eminent Do-
main 555, Sec. 14.24 5th ed. and cases therein cited. 
2. Exception to General Rule in the event that Severance 
Damage can be corrected by Replacement of Like Property. 
The preeminent rule of the "before and after" of sev-
erance damage has its exception. If the severance damage 
which is sustained by the remaining property can be cor-
rected through the substitution of similar property to take 
the place of the property condemned, the measure of dam-
ages may be the cost of acquiring the substitution or replace-
ment property rather than the "before and after" formula. 
This qualification of the general rule is interwoven 
within the precept of just compensation as defined in State 
Road Comm. v. N able,• "that the owners must be put in as 
good a position money wise as they would have occupied 
had their property not been taken." If the severance dam-
age to the remaining land can be cured by the purchase of 
similar and available land and if the purchase price for 
such land is less than the severance damage otherwise de-
termined under the general rule of the "before and after", 
then the cost of such replacement would be an adequate 
measure of damage, for the landowner is thus put in "as 
good a position money wise" as he would have occupied 
prior to condemnation. 
46 U. 2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957). 
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Even as an exception to the "before and after rule", 
the replacement theory of severance damage lacks general 
acceptance. 5 This Court has nonetheless recognized the ap-
plication of the doctrine under restricted facts in two cases, 
Proi•o River Water Users Assn. v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 
133 P. 2d 777 (1943) and State Road Comm. v. Co-op Se-
curity Corp. of the L. D. S. Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P. 
2d 269 (1952). And in two other decisions, State Road 
Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113 (1948) and 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 
693 ( 1960), the Court refused to apply the replacement 
theory because of its irrelevancy to the facts. It is clear 
from those decisions that the "replacement rule" is atypi-
cal and applied only in the event that the appraisal of sev-
erance damages is premised on the claim that the economic 
unit of the total property has been damaged by reason of 
the physical removal and loss of the actual property con-
demned. If the land shrinkage of the economic unit can be 
cured by the substitution or replacement of property of 
equal production and utility and if such property is avail-
able for sale on the open market, the cost to cure or replace 
the condemned property is the measure of severance dam-
age. That is the full import of the "replacement rule" and 
no more. 
sAs the Appellant's Brief will admit, only two other jurisdictions, 
Missouri and Illinois, have recognized the doctrine. The last time the 
lliinois Supreme Court touched on the issue was in 1886, Illinois and 
St. L. Co. v. Switzer, 117 ill. 399, 7 N. E. 664. The Missouri Court 
has mentioned it only twice, once in 1847 and again in 1917. Hannibal 
v. 8chaubacher, 17 Mo. 582 (1847) and City of St. Loui,s V. St. Loui,s 
S. R. Co., 272 Mo. 80 (1917). The leading treatise, Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain, does not make any mention of the rule. 
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Thus in the case of first impression, Provo River 
Water Use1'S Assn. v. Carlson, supra, it was claimed that 
the total dairy farm, although not contiguous, was one eco-
nomic land unit, and that by reason of the condemnation 
fo1· a rese1·voir of 18.'75 acres of wild pasture, the remain-
ing farm one and one-half miles away was all damaged 
uniformly because of the loss to the "dairy farm as a co-
ordinated unit". For the Court, McDonough, J. noted there 
was no claim made that the remainder had been physically 
severed or cut, or left physically inoperable, or damaged 
due to proximity, location and/or use of the reservoir pro-
ject: 
"In this case there u·as no contention that the 
erection of the reservoii· and the relocation of the 
railroad tracks could in any manner injure any of the 
properties of defendant situated in the town of 
Charleston. There was no proof offered to show 
that either the taking of the 18.75 acres for reser-
voir purposes, or the construction of the reservoir, 
could possibly result in any physical impairment of 
the properties f remaining property] in Charleston" 
P. 99 of 103 Utah. 
It was under these facts that this Court declared that 
if the 18.75 ac1·es could be replaced by the purchase of other 
lands, the economic balance and size of the Carlson prop-
erty would be restored and the owners damage would be 
thereupon cured : 
"If he could purchase other pasture land or 
farm land convertible into pasture, within a distance 
from his barns comparable to that of the condemned 
tract, and such other land would provide relatively 
the same kind of forage for the same number of 
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cows or forage of equal ration-value throughout the 
seven months he used the wild pasture tract, it could 
not be contended that his properties in Charleston 
could be impaired or depreciD.:te<l by taking the pas-
ture. If another tract of equal forage-producing 
value and conveniences could be substituted for the 
tract condemned, whether larger or smaller in area, 
the defendant would be in relatively the same posi-
tion he was in before the construction of the reser-
voir." P. 102 of 103 Utah. 
In the subsequent case of State Road Comm. v. Co-op 
Security Corporation of L. D. S. Church, supra, the issue 
of severance damage was similar to that in Carlson. Before 
condemna;tion, the total property of the condemnee was 
comprised of two separate parcels used as a "dairy unit" 
of 100 cow capacity. It was contended by the owner that 
due to the removal and loss of the 7.89 acres condemned 
from one parcel, the available property on which feed could 
be raised was reduced "by about ten head with the result 
that the entire project was damaged at least 20%.'' As in 
Carlson, severance damage was predicated upon the loss to 
the economic unit by shrinkage of the total property size 
and not from factors normally associated with severance 
injury, vis., proximity and location of the public project, 
restriction of access, air, light and view and rendering the 
remainder physically unusable. The Court stated that un-
der such facts, the availability of other land to replace that 
condemned was an issue properly to be raised: 
"If similar land to that taken was available on 
the date the summons was served, which could have 
been substituted for that condemned, it cannot be 
contended that the entire project was depreciated 
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in value because it was made economically unfeasible 
because of lack of pasture land to graze a minimum 
number of dairy cattle. Under such a state of the 
record the opinion of .experits as to the amounts the 
project was damaged was wholly immaterial and 
irrelevant. * * * 
"Since the evidence shows that this property 
could have been replaced there was no basis for the 
award of severance damage except 'as to the two 
small tracts. * * *" P. 140 of 122 Utah. 
Wolfe, C. J. in concurrence, pointed out the limit of the re-
placement rule and the reason it was invoked in 1the case: 
"I concur. I desire to add, however, that when 
severance damages are sought, as in this case, be-
cause the taking of a part of a farm has upset the 
economic balance of the farm and thus has damaged 
that part of the farm n()t condemned, there must be 
proof that there are not available comparable lands 
which could be purchased by the condemnee which 
would restore the economic balance of the farm." 
Between the Carlson and Co-op Security decisions, 
State Road Comm. v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113 
(1948) was decided. There the owners offered to show 
that in a partial-taking of their property, severance dam-
age to a building should be based on the cost of replacement 
or restoring the improvement. This Court rejected the 
proffer in favor of the predominate rule that severance 
damages are determined by the difference in market value 
of the property before and after condemnation: 
"The restoration costs measure of damages is 
appropriate when such restoration costs accurately 
measure the decrease in the market value of the 
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property damaged but not taken. * * * An ef-
fort to measure the effect of its removal simply by 
the cost of removal and its loss as a foundation as 
originally located does not truly reflect the deprecia-
tory effect on the farm. The difference in market 
value of the farm before and after condemnation 
does truly refleot that loss, as presumably the clif-
f erence will be founded upon the various changes 
incident to the proximity of the highway" P. 117 
of 189 P. 2d. 
The most recent case before this Court which raises the 
"replacement rule" is Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 
U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 ( 1960). The landowner's case on 
severance damage therein was hinged upon the depreciation 
in the value of the remaining property due to inadequate 
access, impossibility of use, and physical condition of the 
remainder, all of which was caused by the design, location 
and construction of the railroad project. No claim was 
made for damage from the loss of the condemned acreage 
or from the shrinkage of any economic land unit. The rail-
road contended that the trial court prejudicially erred in 
"submitting the question of severance damages to the jury 
because no competent evidence was produced that other 
similar lands were unavailable". This Court affirmed the 
trial court and held that the question of the availability of 
land to replace the condemned property was quite immater-
ial: 
"Under the above facts, evidence of the unavail-
ability of other lands would be immaterial, because 
the damages to the remaining lands cannot be miti-
gated by obtaining other lands in other places which 
could serve in this unified operation the same pur-
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pose as the lands from which the sand and gravel 
was taken for the use to which the lands were suit-
able" P. 312 of 10 U. 2d. 
Thus, this Court has left little to doubt in these four 
decisions that evidence as to the availability of replacement 
property may be shown in severance damage cases only if: 
( 1) The claim of severance damage stems from the 
removal and loss of property actually condemned caus-
ing a land shrinkage in a formerly balanced economic 
land unit; 
(2) That the substituted property will be of the same 
functional use and will cure the severance damage. 
3. The Replacement Rule was Totally Inapplicable in the 
Style-Crete Case. 
The undisputed damage factors make it impossible to 
bring this case anywhere ·within the reach of the "replace-
ment land" rule of Carlson and Co-op Security. The Style-
Crete industry was in no sense compamble to a dairy farm. 
Style-Crete made no claim that the total land area was an 
economic unit dependent upon productive acreage. And 
Style-Crete did not claim damage due to shrinkage or re-
duction in size of land parcel. The attempt of counsel for 
the State to inject into the case a proffer of "available re-
placement land" was improper for several reasons. Firstly, 
the "available land" was subject to the same defects and 
disadvantages created by the State through condemnation 
and construction of the railroad, as did plague the Style-
Crete property. It was a landlocked parcel with no access. 
Secondly, the claims of severance damage of Style-
Crete stem from the probable vibration of the railroad, the 
Thus, this Court has left little to 
doubt in these five decisions that evidence 
as to the availability of replacement property 
may be shown in severance damages cases only 
if: 
(1) The claim of severance damage 
stems from the removal and loss of 
property actually condemned causing 
a land shrinkage in a formerly balanced 
economic land unit; and 
(2) That the substituted property 
will be of the same functional use, 
will cure the severance damage, and 
will restore the landowner to the 
same relative condition he had prior 
to the taking. 
* * * * * * 
LThe Respondent's Brief now continues 
at line 13 on page 247 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR., 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City,Utah, 
PAUL E. REIMANN, 
500 Kennecott Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Responde~ 
Style Crete, Inc. 
24 (iii) 
Court referred to and distinguished as un-
authori tative the two cases, Co-op Security 
and Carlsen upon which the Stnte urges herein 
as controlling: 
"Both of these cases are distin-
guishable upon their facts. In each 
of them evidence was adduced that 
suitable land could be substituted 
which would restore the landowner to 
the same relative position he had 
prior to the taking. In the instant 
case we do not have a situation wherein 
the land taken from the condemnee (Bing-
hams) could be readily replaced with 
similar land to restore him to the same 
relative condition." Opn. of Callister, J. 
The argument, upon which the State pri-
marily relies herein on pages 23 and 39 of 
its Brief, that the landowner has a burden 
to "mitigate and minimize his severance 
damage", was also raised by the State and 
rejected in the Bingham decision: 
"The State, however, urges that the 
landowner has an additional burden. 
Not only must he prove that there is 
severance damage, but also that he has 
attempted to minimize such damage. 
With this latter proposition we disagree." 
The Bingham case is of controlling pre-
cedent herein for it is clear here (as it 
was in Howes) from all the evidence including 
the excluded proffer of the State, that the 
purchase of the Arnold Machinery land on 
the west was not similar in situation and 
could not "restore" Style Crete "to the same 
relative position it had prior to the taking". 
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The Brief of Style Crete on page 24, 
after line 3 ending with the words L_able" 
P. 312 of 10 U.2d/ should be amended to 
permit the following paragraph in lieu and 
in place of lines 4 through 12 of said page 
24. 
* * * * * * 
The very recent decision of this Court 
in State Road Commission v. Bingham, et al, 
No. 10831 decided on January 23, 1968, is 
significant in the determination of this 
Appeal. There like here, the Road Commission 
argued that as a condition to the recovery 
of severance damages, the owner must prove 
that he could not replace by purchase or 
otherwise in the open market, the property 
interest which had been damaged. In the 
Bingham case, it was the taking of an access 
right which gave rise to the severance damage 
claimed, whereas in the instant case, it was 
the limitation of access together with other 
factors, viz., proximity and pincer of the 
railroad and highway, probable railroad vi-
bration, loss of sanitation and air, light 
and view, which underlay the severance damage 
claim. In both cases, the applicable ruling 
law is the same, since the severance damage 
stems from the "taking for and construction of 
the public project in the manner proposed." 
78-34-10(2) u.c.A. 1953. 
In Bingham, this Court rejected the 
State's appeal and effectually held that the 
purchase of other access to replace or sub-
stitute the access condemned was not rele-
vant, since it would not place the owner's 
land in the same relative position it had 
prior to the taking. In so holding, the 
24 (i) 
